By Suliman Baldo
The coup d’état staged on October 25 by the commanders of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), respectively General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo (“Hemedti”), illustrates how entrenched kleptocratic systems fight back when their interests and stranglehold on national economies are threatened by macroeconomic reform policies and the effective deployment of anti-corruption measures. Eager to recover the assets and unchecked influences the anti-corruption panel stripped from them, Islamist cadres and security operatives regrouped around the security agencies and provided a hastily assembled constituency for a coup that had no popular support.
Also backing the coup were two Darfur armed movements, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement’s faction led by Minni Minawi (SLM-MM). Both are party to the October 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, under which terms signatories secured considerable power and wealth-sharing commitments from the government, ensuring the appointment of JEM’s leader Jibril Ibrahim Mohamed as finance minister and Minawi as Darfur governor. The generals likely promised the two movements even more positions of authority and control over revenue-generating agencies and the state agencies managing the country’s natural resources.
The coup ended a fragile two-year civilian-led transition to democracy in which Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok headed a reformist cabinet under an uneasy power-sharing agreement between the military and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), a broad coalition of grassroots “resistance committees,” workers’ and civil society associations, political parties, and armed movements that fought the Bashir regime and organized the popular protests that ultimately ousted former dictator Omar al-Bashir in April 2019.
The coup took place on October 25, two weeks before the date on which the military was to hand over the Sovereignty Council (SC) chairmanship to a civilian member of the collective head of state body under the terms of the Constitutional Declaration governing the partnership. To pave the way for its power grab, the military instrumentalized divisions among the FFC in the weeks and months prior to the coup and succeeded in attracting some of the disaffected FFC factions to its side, including the JEM and SLM-MM. The military deployed coordinated propaganda campaigns, devised — according to publicly available evidence — by entities linked to Russian operatives of the private security company Wagner Group, prompting Facebook to remove hundreds of pages, groups, and online misinformation media platforms peddling the propaganda.[i], [ii] The inauthentic content magnified the civilian-led cabinet’s weaknesses and favorably cast the military as more apt to lead the country with a firm hand.[iii]
International media coverage underscored the putschists’ political appetite for power as well as their concerns of being held to account for mass atrocities committed under their watch during the Darfur genocidal campaign of 2003–05 and the more recent June 3, 2019, massacre of peaceful participants in a sit-in before the army’s headquarters.[iv]
The response to the October 25 coup was swift and impactful, both on the domestic front and internationally. A new generation that came of age during Bashir’s regime did not want to lay to waste the remainder of their lives under another military autocracy. Their peaceful protests that brought down Bashir renewed with more vigor and intensity across Sudan, successfully rallying the population around the battle cry of “no more military rule.” International financial institutions, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU) and its member states froze their aid and drew down debt forgiveness.
The putschists appear to have underestimated the public response. They placed Hamdok under house arrest and rounded up and sent to secretive detention places members of the cabinet, spokespersons and investigators of an anti-corruption panel, and members of the Neighborhood Resistance Committees who mobilized the prodemocracy protests. Despite this preemptive wave of arrests, highly organized mass protests took place across Sudan from the first hours of the coup. Growing more numerous and defiant by the day, protestors rallied against the coup and demanded that civilian authorities return to the controls of the transition. In the ensuing clampdown, 42 protesters were killed and hundreds more were injured by rounds of live ammunition.[v] Statistics based on information provided by the Central Committee of Sudan’s Doctors show that of those killed, nearly 60% were shot in the head and neck and 36% were shot in the upper chest and abdomen, indicating that security forces used snipers for the distinct purpose of silencing objectors.[vi]
To defuse the protests and reassure the international community of his commitment to a civilian-led transition, Burhan reinstated Hamdok as prime minister on November 21. However, the 14-point political declaration signed by Hamdok and Burhan — who, as chairman of SC had unilaterally reshuffled its membership days earlier to remove FFC representatives and replace them with hand-picked civilian members — only succeeded in isolating the prime minister from his support base and limiting his ability to form an independent technocratic cabinet as stipulated in the agreement.[vii]
News on December 21 of Hamdok’s threat of resignation sent strong messages to both Burhan and his former FFC allies. Hamdok asserted his authority to reappoint officials to positions from which Burhan purged them following the coup. At the same time, the Prime Minister signaled his unhappiness with the attitude of his former allies for what he considered their failure to offer an alternate vision and programs to the pragmatic approach he opted for while limiting his ability to appoint the cabinet.[viii]
A Coup to Deflect Threatening Economic Reforms?
Beyond the obvious political and legal motivations for blocking the transfer of the Sovereignty Council’s leadership to a civilian, the underlying economic drivers for the coup received far less attention and media coverage, both domestically and in international circles. Yet there were ample reasons for the military and security establishment to worry deeply about the immediate and longer-term impacts that the Hamdok cabinet’s macroeconomic reforms and anti-corruption measures could have on their vast economic holdings.
The government’s decision in February 2021 to unify the exchange rate of the Sudanese pound (SDG) to the dollar entailed a sharp devaluation of the official exchange rate from 55 to SDG 375 to the dollar to match the rate in the parallel market at the time.[ix] This devaluation, and the lifting of crippling fuel subsidies in early June, addressed macroeconomic distortions that had for decades hamstrung the national economy, hindering its growth.[x] The two measures triggered a steep increase in inflation across the board to a staggering 400% rate and a loss of the purchasing power of wages and salaries, thus placing the largest share of the burden of the reforms on the shoulders of most of the Sudanese living on fixed wages or day-to-day earnings from the informal economy. Despite the increasing hardships, the government failed to roll out persuasive messaging on its policies’ longer-term benefits and potential for revitalizing the national economy. The anticipated increases in the chances of economic growth would mean better revenues for producers in Sudan’s mainstay sectors of agriculture and livestock, greater revenues for the government to invest in reviving the collapsed public health and education sectors, and more job opportunities as Sudanese and foreign entrepreneurs increase their investments.
The bold macroeconomic reforms undertaken in 2020 and into 2021 by the transitional government, backed by the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Staff Monitored Program, led the IMF and the World Bank (WB) to grant Sudan access to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative on June 29, 2021, and to approve $2.5 billion in IMF grants and easy loans, known as “extended credit facilities” (ECFs), over three years.[xi] The approvals marked Sudan’s arrival to the “Decision Point,” rewarding the transitional government’s track record of commitment to far-reaching macroeconomic reforms in earlier months and the clearance of its arrears to the two institutions and the African Development Bank. To reach the “Completion Point” for debt forgiveness three years down a path of reforms that would see its foreign debts drop from a $56 billion to $6 billion, the transitional government entered into formal agreements with the international financial institutions and other major donors. The agreements galvanized a set of benchmarks and triggers meant to spur the government’s continuous adherence to transparency and good governance and its commitment to cracking down on corruption and money laundering.[xii]
Will the Coup Honor Prior Commitments of Serious Economic Reforms?
The political will of the coup perpetrators to allow the implementation of prior commitments undertaken by Sudan to roll out serious and systemic economic reforms appears in serious doubt. Indeed, the letter and spirit of the agreements binding the toppled transitional government and its international backers charted a roadmap to economic reform that undoubtedly represented real threats to the entrenched financial interests of the business empires that Sudan’s security sector continued to control. For instance, in compliance with its agreements with the IMF and WB, the Ministry of Finance published the names of all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on its website for the first time ever in April 2021.[xiii] The list included security sector companies under tabs for the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, lifting a veil of secrecy the Bashir regime strictly maintained for decades. Several companies linked to the General Intelligence Services also appeared on the list.[xiv] Not all the names of “security companies” were published, as several were found to have been registered to individuals, although they were initially capitalized with public funds — hence the label of “preliminary” that the Ministry of Finance gave to its April inventory.[xv]
The publication added to the urgency of the public debate in Sudan about bringing all SOEs and security sector companies under the Ministry of Finance’s control and subjecting them to the state’s regulatory and oversight agencies. Bending to the pressure, in May 2021 the Defense Industries System (DIS), the SAF’s conglomerate managing all the holding companies owned by the army and their subsidiaries, publicly agreed with the civilian-led cabinet to a plan that would allow DIS companies producing military goods to remain under army control, while others engaged in the production of civilian goods and services or engaged in commercial activities would eventually be transformed into publicly owned companies.[xvi] At this writing, no practical steps have been undertaken to implement this proposed compromise.[xvii]
The ECF arrangement the transitional government agreed to with the IMF is meant to stabilize a wide range of policy reforms to accompany Sudan’s progress from the “Decision Point” to the “Completion Point” of the debt forgiveness process.[xviii] Some of these reforms, such as the unification of the exchange rate and the elimination of tax and customs exemptions, removed distinct advantages that the security services and other economic pillars of Bashir’s kleptocratic regime enjoyed for three decades. Economist Saeed Abu Kambal suggested in a 2016 article that the lucky beneficiaries of access to the official rate of the dollar, which at the time was SDG 6, compared to SDG 11 in the parallel market, likely included companies linked to security services, the ruling party, and key figures in both bodies.[xix]
Other benchmarks that the government committed to meet by predetermined dates in the IMF agreement that unlocked its access to ECFs included adherence to tough standards of transparency, accountability for public money, credible anti-corruption safeguards, and good corporate governance for all SOEs. On June 10, 2021, Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim — the architect of the impending coup — spelled out these commitments in a Letter of Intent addressed to Managing Director of the IMF Kristalina Georgieva outlining steps that the transitional government intended to take in 2021 and 2022 per the terms of the ECF arrangement.[xx]
Some of these commitments could only be seen as ominously and directly threatening to the financial autonomy of security sector companies and other powerful SOEs, such as those over which the Mining and Energy and Oil ministries preside. The agreed-upon reforms included:
► Publishing the year-end 2021 financial statements and financial audit reports by the National Audit Chamber for 10 SOEs and a calendar of their annual publication thereafter. The targeted companies included three of the top revenue earners in the army’s DIS, namely Zadna International Investment Co. Ltd., Giad Holding Co. and all its subsidiaries, and Eletegahat Co. (Multiple Directions Co.).
► Improving the oversight of SOEs by updating the inventory of SOEs and subjecting them to management by the Ministry of Finance.
· If properly implemented, such audits and oversight by the Finance Ministry would seriously curtail the practice of the most offending SOEs, such as the DIS companies, of acting as states within the state. According to an investigative report by journalist Abdel Moneim Suliman, in 2017 Bashir’s rubber stamp parliament approved a law that renamed the army’s Military Industrial Corporation the “Defense Industries System,” granted the DIS administrative and financial autonomy from the Ministry of Defense and placed it under the presidency. The law empowered the DIS to invest its resources independent of the Auditor General Chamber’s authority. It also exempted the DIS from Sudan’s laws governing procurement, contracting, and financial and accounting procedures and granted its workers wide immunities for actions undertaken in dispensing their duties.[xxi]
· This reform would end a long-standing practice — one perpetrated by the DIS and other powerful SOEs and, more recently, companies linked to RSF commanders — of obtaining loans from the CBOS through Letters of Guarantees of repayment from the Ministry of Finance. In many cases, the borrowing SOEs failed to repay their loans.[xxii]
► Eliminating current weaknesses in Sudan’s anti-money launder/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CTF) framework, including by conducting inspections of high-risk banks as determined by the CBOS’s assessments, with focus on involvement of Politically Exposed Persons and reporting suspicious transactions.
► Continuing the work of the “Dismantling Committee” established by December 2019 legislation to dismantle the institution of the Bashir regime, recover stolen public assets, and hold accountable serious offenders.
· The military partners in the transition had serious run-ins with the “Dismantling Committee.” In February 2021, the chairman of the committee, General Yasir al-Atta, resigned, citing in local press interviews the persistent criticism of the committee’s performance, the lack of due diligence guarantees, and the delay in establishing an appeal mechanism of its decisions as required under its law.[xxiii]
► Combating post-Bashir-era corruption by establishing a national anti-corruption commission endowed with strong mandates to prevent, detect, and investigate corruption and by referring perpetrators to the Attorney General’s Office for prosecution.
· The transitional government was on track to meet this benchmark by the set date of the end of September, following the entry in force of the law establishing the commission and nearing the completion of the open competitive selection process for the seven commissioners by the time the coup took place.[xxiv]
► Strengthening public financial management, including by establishing a Treasury Single Account (TSA) to consolidate all accounts of government ministries and units at the CBOS.
· In many jurisdictions suffering from rampant corruption, the creation of a TSA has been an effective tool for improving the management of the government’s cash resources, lowering the cost of borrowing, and fighting graft. In Sudan, the introduction of a TSA, for which The Sentry has strongly advocated in multiple reports and advocacy documents, would end the widespread practice of “Tagneeb,” or keeping off-budget accounts by government ministries and SOEs.[xxv]
Navigating the Unintended Consequences
The damage, however, has been done. The cost of the coup to Sudan’s budding economic recovery is devastating. Magdi Amin, senior advisor to the WB seconded to the Ministry of Finance to help plan and roll out the necessary reforms, gave a breakdown in a recent webinar of aid disbursements suspended in 2021–22. These disbursements were pegged to benchmarks being met by the government as determined by independent assessments. According to that account, the WB and IMF were poised to disburse $950 million in November and December and another $1.8 billion in 2022, provided that the transitional government met its commitments.[xxvi]
The US withheld another $700 million in direct economic assistance to Sudan in the wake of the coup, demanding an end to the use of excessive force and detentions against protesters and the restoration of the transition for the resumption of aid.[xxvii] Creditors of the Paris Club froze action on pledged debt relief for Sudan totaling $14 billion.[xxviii], [xxix] European banks that began building correspondence relationships with Sudanese banks and leading businesses also suspended their overtures.[xxx]
The coup occurred at a critical moment in Sudan’s political and economic transition. It threatens to derail the anticipated benefits from the structural reforms, of which the brunt of the burden fell on Sudanese wage earners and traditional producers who struggled to make ends meet but showed great patience and hoped that the lifting of the economy would permanently improve their lives. Following the unification of the exchange rate earlier in the year, the inflation rate began to slow from its peak as one of the highest in the world, and the currency showed signs of stabilizing. The suspension of economic assistance affects economic development projects negotiated with line ministries over months. These projects were meant in part to rehabilitate conflict-affected areas rapidly, invest more resources in human development, and improve the infrastructure for the needs of a recovering economy.[xxxi] Given the predictable impacts of suspending these processes, the Economist Intelligence Unit warned days after the coup that “without crucial financial aid, Sudan’s economy will descend into freefall.”[xxxii]
The first to recognize the approaching disaster was none other than Finance Minister and key supporter of the coup Jibril, who continued running the ministry after the coup at a time when the prime minister, his senior advisors, several ministers, and hundreds of prodemocracy activists were being rounded up and detained by order of Burhan. Jibril confided in an interview with The National News that he was “saddened” by the cessation of the economic reform program he steered under Hamdok’s leadership that led to Sudan gaining Western support and commitments of financial aid. He later acknowledged that Sudan missed out on disbursements of $650 million of international aid in November. However, Jibril sounded a defiant note that the world would have to deal with the technocratic government the putsch intended to establish with or without Hamdok and hoped that friendly Arab countries would help Sudan pay for its imports of strategic commodities.[xxxiii],[xxxiv]
The response from Hemedti was blunter, as he warned the US and EU that they could face a surge in refugees from Sudan if they failed to assist the regime established by the October coup.[xxxv] By using the migration issue as a latent threat to Europe, the general appeared to be borrowing a page from the Bashir-era practice of threatening Europe with floods of migrants and the US with harboring terrorists.[xxxvi]
Many of the decisions Burhan made prior to Hamdok’s reinstatement were indicative of a de facto military autocrat, and later a self-appointed governing body, pressing to control the economy through executive fiat. Given the wide reach of the commitments the civilian-led cabinet made to international financial institutions and other Sudan donors and creditors, the very first wave of politically motivated purges and appointments of new officials announced by Burhan appeared aimed at slowing down, if not reversing, the pace of progress.
Among those removed were the deputy governor of the CBOS, Faroug Mohamed al-Nour, who oversaw the implementation of reforms needed to enforce the independence of the CBOS and its mandate to oversee the financial and banking sector. Burhan also decreed the removal of CEOs of government-controlled banks and all managing directors of SOEs.[xxxvii] With many of the new appointees to positions of responsibility having served in the same positions under Bashir, concern grew that the architects and experts of state capture would make a comeback to business.[xxxviii], [xxxix]
Particularly revealing in this regard was the systematic way in which the coup architects sought to discredit the work of the Committee to Dismantle the Bashir regime even prior to the coup, and the detention of key members of the committee, both in the capital Khartoum, and officials and investigators of its chapters in different states.[xl], [xli]
Evolving Responses to the Coup
The November 21 agreement between Burhan and Hamdok that led to the reinstatement of Hamdok as prime minister appears to have restrained the putschists, leading to the release of some high-profile detainees and the reduction — if not cessation — of the use of force against the protestors, as Hamdok demanded in the agreement.[xlii] In an apparent push to test the military’s commitment to the terms of the agreement, Hamdok rescinded the appointments Burhan made to positions of undersecretaries of ministries and secretaries of federal states. He has yet to reverse unjustified purges and appointments pushed by Burhan in the banking and SOE sectors. As the protests continued unabated and became more radicalized in rejecting not only any dialogue or partnership with the military rule but even the Burhan-Hamdok accord, and were joined in this rejection by the FFC, it became evident that there was no easy and safe landing for this crisis.
While the African Union hastily ended its suspension of Sudan’s membership in the regional body following the reinstatement of Hamdok, the EU, the US, and international financial institutions adopted a more cautious approach. Considering the decision a welcome first step, they observed a wait-and-see posture to assess the situation, focusing on the space Hamdok would have to appoint his cabinet without interference from the military and the unilaterally appointed SC. Meanwhile, all aid remained suspended at this writing.
It is increasingly evident that economic assistance to Sudan will not resume until a new cabinet is appointed and commits to pursuing the reforms agreed upon with the toppled government.
To the Transitional Government of Sudan:
► Ensure that all security services and government-affiliated paramilitaries desist from the use of force and unlawful detentions in their response to mass protests against the coup and release all political detainees and activists.
► Direct security services to protect the rights of the Sudanese to free speech, association, and travel and to observe other fundamental rights codified in Sudanese law, the Constitutional Declaration, and international human rights instruments to which Sudan is party.
► Hold to account under appropriate laws members of security forces who perpetrate violence and rapes against civilians and engage in intercommunal violence in Darfur, Kordofan, and other states of Sudan.
► Expeditiously implement the transitional government’s decision to handover to the International Criminal Court former President Omer al-Bashir and his two co-indictees wanted by the Court to answer for war crimes, crimes against humanity and geocide committed in Darfur.
► Extract the security services from all forms of intervention in the political process.
► Subject all SOEs to Ministry of Finance oversight and periodic audits by the National Audit Chamber.
► Cease intimidating and harassing whistleblowers and anti-corruption activists, reporters, and transparency civil society organizations.
► Restore the work of the Committee to Dismantle the June 30, 1989 Regime, Eradicate Its Tamkeen System, Recover Public Assets, and Combat Corruption with full respect to due process guarantees under Sudanese law and operationalize the committee’s appeal mechanism as defined in its law.
► Allow the process for the establishment of the independent National Commission to Combat Corruption and Recover Public Assets to complete its course by finalizing the work of the independent technical committee that was in the process of reviewing candidates’ applications for the seven commissioner positions.
► Recommit to all the technical benchmarks already agreed upon with international financial institutions and the donor community to secure Sudan’s full access to the benefits of its accession in mid-2021 to the HIPC initiative and resume its receipt of financial aid.
To the International Community:
► Continue to insist that Sudan meet the human rights, justice, anti-corruption, and economic reforms benchmarks outlined in the recommendations to the transitional government.
► Continue to press the self-appointed SC not to interfere with Hamdok’s selection of his ministers.
► Condition the resumption of economic assistance and debt relief on the transitional government and SC’s recommitment to the terms and benchmarks previously negotiated with international financial institutions and Sudan’s creditors.
► Closely monitor the transitional government’s performance in implementing policies of economic, legal, and institutional reforms that consolidate the political and economic transition in Sudan and lead to transparent, free, and fair electoral processes at the end of the transitional period.
► Impose targeted network sanctions on those undermining the transition to democracy or democratic process and institutions, those responsible for — or complicit in — serious human rights abuses, and those engaged in grand corruption and their corresponding commercial interests.
► Issue advisories about the money-laundering risks associated with the security forces and companies under their control.
► Remain committed to support the democratization of Sudan — even if the military retains control — by increasing support to civil society associations, including grassroots groups epitomizing the Sudanese people’s aspiration for democracy and rejection of military rule.
► Increase support for human rights organizations, anti-corruption activists, and the capacity building of political parties preparing for elections.
[i] Medium, “Sudanese Facebook Network Promoting Paramilitary Group Removed Month Before Coup,” October 28, 2021, available at: https://medium.com/dfrlab/sudanese-facebook-network-promoting-paramilitary-group-removed-month-before-coup-48f30b46ffe0
[ii] Facebook, “September 2021 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Report,” available at: https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Sept-2021-CIB-Report.pdf
[iii] Medium, “Inauthentic Facebook Assets Promoted Russian Interests in Sudan,” June 3, 2021, available at: https://medium.com/dfrlab/inauthentic-facebook-assets-promoted-russian-interests-in-sudan-2623c58b1f7f
[iv] Human Rights Watch, “They Were Shouting ‘Kill Them,’” November 17, 2019, available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/11/18/they-were-shouting-kill-them/sudans-violent-crackdown-protesters-khartoum
[v] Middle East Eye, “Sudan Coup: The Names and Faces of the Protesters Killed,” November 25, 2021, available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-coup-protesters-killed-names-faces
[vi] Middle East Eye, Op. Cit., drawing on statistics of the Central Committee of Sudan Doctors.
[vii] For more details, see Africa Confidential, “Hamdok Wavers as His Isolation Grows,” December 6, 2021, available at: https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/13706/Hamdok_wavers_as_his_isolation_grows
[viii] Reuters, “Sudan’s PM Hamdok Intends to Resign Within Hours -Sources,” December 22, 2021, available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-pm-hamdok-intends-resign-within-hours-two-sources-2021-12-21/
[ix] Khalid Abdelaziz, “Sudan Devalues Currency to Meet Key Condition for Debt Relief,” Reuters, February 21, 2021, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-economy/sudan-devalues-currency-to-meet-key-condition-for-debt-relief-idUSKBN2AL06P
[x] Reuters, “Sudan Ends Subsidies for Gasoline and Diesel, Raises Prices,” June 8, 2021, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-economy/sudan-ends-subsidies-for-gasoline-and-diesel-raises-prices-idUSKCN2DK2OY
[xi] International Monetary Fund, “IMF Executive Board Approves Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for Sudan,” June 29, 2021, available at: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/06/29/pr21198-sudan-imf-executive-board-approves-extended-credit-facility-arrangement
[xii] Reuters, “Sudan Approved for Debt Relief, $2.5 Billion Funding by IMF,” June 30, 2021, available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-crosses-last-hurdle-towards-debt-relief-sudanese-official-2021-06-28/
[xiii] Sudan Ministry of Finance, “Preliminary Listing of the Government’s Public Companies,” April 5, 2021, available at: https://tinyurl.com/yfdc9dxe
[xiv] See Suliman Baldo, “Sudan Struggles to Control Its Parastatals,” The Sentry, May 2021, available at: https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/SudanParastatals-TheSentry-May2021.pdf
[xv] The Sentry interview with former official of the Finance Ministry, August 15, 2021.
[xvi] See note 13.
[xvii] The Sentry interviews with former government officials and business leaders, September 2021.
[xviii] International Monetary Fund, “Key Questions on Sudan,” available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/SDN/frequently-asked-questions-on-sudan
[xix] Saeed Abu-Kambal, “To Whom Is Sold the Dollar Priced at the Official Rate?” Alrakoba news website, January 31, 2016, in Arabic, available at: www.shorturl.at/yJLW3
[xx] International Monetary Fund eLibrary, “Sudan: Request for a 39-Month Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Sudan, Appendix I. Letter of Intent,” June 10, 2021, pp. 44–65, available at: https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2021/142/002.2021.issue-142-en.xml
[xxi] Abdel Moneim Suliman, “The Defense Industries System: I Took All and Gave Nothing Back,” Alrakoba news website, November 5, 2021, in Arabic, available at: https://bit.ly/3lEFAgH
[xxii] World Bank, “Debt Management Performance Assessment (DeMPA) — Sudan,” May 2012, available at: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/815881592945197966/pdf/Sudan-Debt-Management-Performance-Assessment-Tool-DeMPA.pdf
[xxiii] Sudan in the News, “Sudan Tribune — Head of Sudan’s Anti-Corruption Body Resigns Over Criticism,” February 18, 2021, originally published February 5, 2021, available at: https://www.sudaninthenews.com/february-5/sudan-news-alert-sudan-tribune-head-of-sudans-anti-corruption-body-resigns-over-criticism
[xxiv] The Sentry’s monitoring, July-September 2021, including communications with officials involved in establishing the commission and civil society groups accompanying the process.
[xxv] On Tagneeb, see Suliman Baldo, “Sudan’s Self-Inflicted Economic Meltdown: With a Corrupt Economy in Crisis, the Bashir Regime Scrambles to Consolidate Power,” an Enough Project Report, November 20, 2018, available at: https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/SudanEconomicMeltdown_Enough_November2018-web.pdf
[xxvi] Magdi Amin, “Sudan Economic Reform and HIPC: Impact of Political Developments,” a webinar hosted by the Association of Sudanese-American Professors in America (ASAPA), November 14, 2021, available at: https://youtu.be/cJkJC8YTTF4
[xxvii] New York Times, “The U.S. Cut Off Aid to the Sudanese Government After the Coup,” October 25, 2021, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/25/world/africa/us-aid-frozen-sudan.html
[xxviii] Associated Press, “Sudan Gets $14 Billion in Debt Relief From Paris Club,” July 16, 2021, available at: https://apnews.com/article/europe-middle-east-africa-business-sudan-59e60f3440440ed17aa7ea2ac38376c9
[xxix] France 24, “World Bank Freezes Sudan Aid Over Coup as Civil Disobedience Grows,” October 28, 2021, available at: https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20211027-world-bank-freezes-sudan-aid-over-coup-as-civil-disobedience-grows
[xxx] Africa Intelligence, “Banks Follow States and Financial Institutions and Ditch Burhan,” November 17, 2021, available at: https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-and-southern-africa_business/2021/11/17/banks-follow-states-and-financial-institutions-and-ditch-burhan,109705400-art
[xxxi] Economist Intelligence Unit, “What Next for Sudan?” November 3, 2021, available at: https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1861557769&Country=Sudan&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast
[xxxii] Economist Intelligence Unit, “World Bank and US Suspend Aid to Sudan” November 3, 2021, available at: https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1781568761&Country=Sudan&topic=Economy&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Economic+growth
[xxxiii] The National News, “Sudan’s Finance Minister: World Will ‘Move On’ From Army Takeover,” November 9, 2021, available at: https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/2021/11/09/sudans-finance-minister-world-will-move-on-from-army-takeover/
[xxxiv] Reuters, “EXCLUSIVE Sudan Cut Off From $650 Million of International Funding After Coup,” December 8, 2021, available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/exclusive-sudan-cut-off-650-million-international-funding-after-coup-2021-12-08/
[xxxv] Politico, “Top Sudan General Warns Country Could Be Source of Refugee Influx to Europe,” December 1, 2021, available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/mohamed-hamdan-dagalo-sudan-refugee-borders-military/
[xxxvi] See Suliman Baldo, “Border Control From Hell: How the EU’s Migration Partnership Legitimizes Sudan’s “Militia State,” an Enough Project Report, April 6, 2017, available at: https://enoughproject.org/files/BorderControl_April2017_Enough_Finals.pdf
[xxxvii] Sudan News Agency, “Al-Burhan Issues Decision Relieving Directors of Government Banks, Naming Successors,” November 7, 2021, available at: https://suna-sd.net/read?id=726081
[xxxviii] Bloomberg, “Sudan Coup Leaders Tighten Grip With Jobs for Loyalists, Arrests,” November 8, 2021, available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-08/sudan-coup-leaders-tighten-grip-with-jobs-for-loyalists-arrests
[xxxix] Al-Sharq al-Awsat, “The Sudanese Authorities Re-Appointed Former Officials to Vital Positions,” November 11, 2021, in Arabic, available at: https://tinyurl.com/y6pmfnxv
[xl] Amnesty International, “Sudan: Immediately Free Detainees; Halt Arrests,” November 9, 2021, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/11/sudan-immediately-free-detainees-halt-arrests/
[xli] Almayadeen, “Al-Burhan Announces Formation of Committee for Recovering Al-Bashir Funds,” November 10, 2021, available at: https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/alburhan-announces-formation-of-committee-for-recovering-alb
[xlii] For the text of the agreement, see the unofficial translation by IDEA.